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SILENCED STORIES: HOW VICTIM
IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS
PREVENTS THE JURY FROM HEARING
THE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
STORY OF THE DEFENDANT
Diana Minot*
The victims’ son reports that his parents had been married for fifty-three years and
enjoyed a very close relationship, spending each day together. He states that his
father had worked hard all his life and been retired for eight years. He described his
mother as a woman who was young at heart and never seemed like an old lady . . . .
[The victims] were amazing people who attended the senior citizen center and made
many devout friends . . . . As described by their family members, the Bronsteins were
loving parents and grandparents whose family was most important to them . . . .
Because of their loss, a terrible void has been put into [their] family’s lives and every
1
day is still a strain just to get through.

***
Four of defendant’s siblings testified concerning their childhood. Larry testified that
Pearl and Art beat the children, sometimes while the children were tied up, and forced
them to steal . . . . Art killed Larry’s sister Helen . . . by smothering her. In 1957, the
children were taken by the State of Nebraska and placed in Whitehall Home for
Children. Larry stated that a housemother at Whitehall taught both defendant and him
about sex, instructing them that “you got to hit them in the mouth before you do
anything or they don’t like it.” He testified that he and defendant were transferred to a
state mental institution, where they were beaten and sexually abused and drugs were
administered . . . . Another sibling, Steven, corroborated the foregoing testimony and
also recounted that “the first sexual experiences were the girls with Art and the boys
with mom.” The eldest daughter, who ran away before Art joined the family, testified
that her father molested her, with Pearl’s knowledge, and that Pearl blamed the
2
daughter for the molestation.

*

J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2012. I would like to thank
everyone who offered assistance and advice in the creation of this Comment. Thanks in
particular to James Lupo.
1
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 510, 514–15 (1987).
2
People v. Foster, 242 P.3d 105, 124–25 (Cal. 2010).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Compare these two quotes. The first comes from a victim impact
statement at a capital sentencing trial. The second is information presented
on behalf of a capital defendant at another capital sentencing trial. The
victim impact statement matches more closely with most people’s
experience in the world. This Comment will argue that, for the typical
juror, the victim impact statement is much easier to identify with, drowning
out the story of the defendant, who is faced with the prospect of capital
punishment. This makes the emotional story of the victim the only story
given meaningful consideration by the jury.
Cognitive psychology shows that humans filter new information
through existing schema.3 This Comment will define schemas and show
how, because jurors generally have different life experiences than
defendants, it is easier for the juror to identify with the murdered victim’s
schema than with the defendant’s schema. Because of this, the stories told
in victim impact evidence are unduly prejudicial, overwhelming any
mitigating factors in a capital sentencing trial. Thus, the defendant does not
have an opportunity to present evidence of his or her moral culpability as
the Constitution requires in capital sentencing trials.4
This argument will consist of five parts. Part II will discuss the current
state of capital punishment jurisprudence in the United States. Part III will
give an overview of the current state of the law on victim impact evidence,
outlining how the Supreme Court initially proscribed such evidence but
later reversed itself, and in doing so failed to give guidance to lower courts
on what manner of victim impact evidence was acceptable. Part IV will
give an overview and explanation of what are known in cognitive
psychology as schemas. This will include an explanation of how schemas
cause people to filter information in a predetermined way, potentially
ignoring information that does not easily fit into this format.
Part V will show how the schemas of most jurors cause them to easily
accept the emotionally charged stories presented in victim impact
statements, thereby silencing defendants’ stories. Part VI will analyze the
case of United States v. Sampson, contrasting the story of the victim told by
the victim impact evidence with the story of the defendant told by
mitigating evidence.5

3

Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 273, 279 (1989).
4
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
5
335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CAPITAL SENTENCING LAW
To understand the argument against victim impact statements in capital
trials, it is first necessary to understand the background of current capital
sentencing jurisprudence. The death penalty’s constitutionality is largely
understood through the seminal case of Furman v. Georgia.6 An overview
of decisions regarding capital sentencing will show that, since Furman, the
Supreme Court has focused its efforts on ending arbitrariness and
discrimination in capital sentencing. Capital punishment is unique from
other forms of punishment because it is absolutely irrevocable.7 While law
should always be fair, the irrevocability of capital punishment has led the
Court to determine that it is especially imperative to be unwaveringly
scrupulous and fair when meting out capital punishment.8
A. FURMAN V. GEORGIA AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Furman and other Court decisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s
developed the constitutional doctrine that death sentences are “qualitatively
different” from other criminal sentences. Strict oversight of state death
sentencing was needed so that states’ death-sentencing systems were
evenhanded and nondiscriminatory.9
The state has much greater power than an individual defendant.
Because of this, the Eighth Amendment attempts to level the playing field
between the defendant and the state by affording extra protections to
defendants to counteract the greater power of the state.10 The Supreme
Court has ruled that a sentence of death must be proportionate to a
particular offense; otherwise, it is cruel and unusual punishment.11 Furman
invoked the Eighth Amendment prohibition in the context of capital
punishment by arguing that, because death sentences were imposed by
juries in such a small minority of death-eligible cases and without
guidelines or standards, these sentences therefore constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.12
The Court in Furman found punishment to be cruel and unusual if it
was too severe for the crime, was imposed arbitrarily, offended society’s
6

409 U.S. 902 (1972).
AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
CONDITION 89 (2001).
8
DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1–2 (1990).
9
Id.
10
Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
361, 402 (1996).
11
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301 (1987).
12
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 11.
7
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sense of justice, or was not more effective than a less severe penalty.13 This
standard effectively invalidated the death penalty statutes of forty states,
thereby commuting the sentences of 629 death row inmates across the
country.14 This standard also jeopardized the continuing viability of the
death penalty.15
Since Furman suspended the death penalty without condemning it
forever, states wishing to impose the death penalty instituted a variety of
new procedures in an attempt to correct the deficiencies in their death
penalty statutes.16 The Supreme Court had condemned these statutes as
standardless, discretionary, and, therefore, unconstitutional.17
What
followed was an overhaul of state statutes governing the death penalty, with
most state statutes now requiring the presence of at least one aggravating
circumstance before a death sentence could be sought.18 Most state laws
identify between six and twelve factors as aggravating circumstances.19
B. GREGG V. GEORGIA SANCTIONS THE STATE’S REVISIONS TO DEATH
PENALTY SENTENCING PROCEDURES, APPROVING BIFURCATED
TRIALS

Following the states’ overhaul of their death penalty statutes, the next
important death penalty case the Supreme Court heard was Gregg v.
Georgia, which affirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty as
punishment for murder.20 In addition to ruling that the death penalty itself
was constitutional, the Court considered revised death penalty statutes from
Florida, Georgia, and Texas, and held them constitutional, noting that the
new Georgia statute had sufficient safeguards to prevent the risk of the
arbitrary or excessive death sentences that the Court had condemned in
Furman.21
Also important in Gregg was the Supreme Court’s approval of
bifurcated trials.22 The Court recognized that the sentencer in a capital trial
must have discretion to consider the particular character and record of the
13

History of the Death Penalty: Part I, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty#const (last visited Mar. 11,
2010) [hereinafter DPIC, History].
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 22.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
21
Id. at 226–27 (1976).
22
Id. at 191–92 (1976).
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offender and the circumstances of the particular offense, and that capital
sentencing must be contextual and particularistic.23 States accomplished
this in their revised death penalty statutes through bifurcated trials.24
A bifurcated trial consists of a guilt phase and a sentencing phase. In
the guilt phase, the jury hears evidence and argument relating only to the
defendant’s guilt. The jury’s task in this phase is to determine whether or
not the defendant is guilty of murder.25 If the jury decides that the
defendant is guilty of murder, the trial goes into the second phase, the
sentencing phase. In the sentencing phase, the prosecution and defense
present evidence relating to an appropriate sentence.26
C. AN EXPLANATION OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS

As an example of a death penalty statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3593 is the
federal statute requiring a separate trial for the guilt and sentencing phases
of a capital trial.27 The statute governs the sentencing phase of a capital
trial, which calls on the jury to decide two things: whether the defendant is
eligible for the death penalty, and, if so, whether the death penalty is
justified.28 For the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, the jury
must find that at least one aggravating factor has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.29 The sentencing trial must include the opportunity to
present aggravating and mitigating factors.30 Any mitigating factor is
considered relevant if it has any tendency to make any fact of consequence
to the determination of the action more or less likely than it would have
been without the evidence.31
Further, 18 U.S.C. § 3592 outlines some aggravating and mitigating
factors that are either permitted or required.32 Victim impact evidence is
23

Id. at 206.
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 23.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2006).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 275 (2004). Note that this “more or less likely
standard” is less stringent than the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” needed for
aggravating factors.
32
18 U.S.C. § 3592. Some examples of mitigating factors included in the statute are
minor participation, no prior criminal record, or “other factors in the defendant’s
background, record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense that mitigate
against imposition of the death sentence.” Id. Examples of aggravating factors included in
the statute are previous conviction of other serious offenses, grave risk of death to additional
persons, substantial planning and premeditation, or a “heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of
24
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generally considered a non-statutory aggravating factor.33 Information is
admissible regardless of its admissibility under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, but the evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice.34 Although current
law does not consider victim impact statements unfairly prejudicial, this
Comment will argue that such statements do indeed cause unfair prejudice.
The government’s burden of proof for aggravating factors is beyond a
reasonable doubt.35 The defendant’s burden of proof for mitigating factors
is preponderance of the evidence.36 Separating the guilt and sentencing
phases allows the jury to consider evidence during sentencing that was
inadmissible for determining guilt but is relevant to the sentencing
decision.37 Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that a jury must be
allowed to give meaningful consideration to relevant mitigating evidence.38
Any law or instruction from the bench prohibiting the jury from considering
any particular mitigating factor is unconstitutional.39 A defendant’s right to
have mitigating evidence considered is meaningless if the sentencer is not
permitted to consider it in imposing a sentence.40
Lockett v. Ohio emphasized the significance of mitigating factors.41 A
plurality in Lockett held that meaningful consideration of mitigating factors
is required regardless of the severity of the crime or whether or not the
defendant has potential for future dangerousness.42 For a defendant to be
sentenced to death, the jury must determine that the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating factors enough to justify death.43
The bottom line of death penalty jurisprudence is that death is different
from other forms of punishment.44 The Supreme Court, in crafting its
policies on capital punishment, has constructed a kind of “super due
process.”45 The Court wanted to afford capital defendants an extra measure
of protection against arbitrariness, impulse, or emotionalism.46
committing [the] offense.” Id.
33
See § 3593.
34
§ 3593(c).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 23.
38
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 264 (2007).
39
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 23.
40
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185 (1988).
41
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 25.
42
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978).
43
United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 176 (D. Mass. 2004).
44
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 1–2.
45
SARAT, supra note 7, at 37.
46
Id.
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In the sentencing phase of capital trials, the jury’s attention was directed exclusively
to the task of ascertaining the precise, personal culpability of the defendant. Did this
particular murderer, given the full circumstances of his or her life, deserve to die at
the hands of the state? Here the courts carried out the most exacting calculus of
47
retribution.

The allowance of victim impact statements in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial frustrates this “super due process.” Because death is different,
the damage done by any frustration of due process is heightened. The use
of victim impact statements in capital sentencing therefore warrants special
consideration.
III. CURRENT LAW ON VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
Having reviewed the current state of the law on the death penalty in
the United States, we next turn to the current state of the law on victim
impact statements in capital trials. The Supreme Court has decided three
major cases on victim impact statements in capital trials: Booth v.
Maryland,48 a 1987 case that proscribed victim impact evidence in capital
cases; South Carolina v. Gathers,49 a 1989 case that clarified part of the
ruling in Booth; and Payne v. Tennessee,50 a 1991 case that overruled Booth
just four years after it was decided (and effectively overruled Gathers as
well). In addition, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kelly v.
California,51 a recent capital murder case involving victim impact evidence.
These decisions are considered below.
A. BOOTH V. MARYLAND—THE SUPREME COURT PROHIBITS VICTIM
IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS

Booth v. Maryland, the first major victim impact case in the Supreme
Court, involved the brutal stabbing murder of an older couple.52 John
Booth was one of two men who invaded the couple’s home to rob them. 53
Because Booth was a neighbor of the couple, he knew they would be able to
recognize him.54 As a result, the two men bound and gagged the couple and
stabbed them repeatedly in their chests with a kitchen knife.55 Two days

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id.
482 U.S. 496 (1987).
490 U.S. 805 (1989).
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
171 P.3d 548 (Cal. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2008).
Booth, 482 U.S. at 497–98.
Id. at 497–98.
Id.
Id. at 498.
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later, their bodies were discovered by their son.56
At trial, Booth was found guilty on two counts of first-degree murder,
and the prosecution sought the death penalty.57 The state prepared a
presentence report of Booth’s background, education, employment history,
and criminal record.58 Because it was required by Maryland statute, the
report also included a victim impact statement, which described the effect
of the crime on the victim and his family.59 The victim impact statement
was created based on interviews with the son, daughter, son-in-law, and
granddaughter of the murdered couple.60
The statement included
descriptions of the couple’s “outstanding personal qualities,” as well as the
emotional and personal problems their family had to endure as a result of
the murders.61
Booth’s defense counsel moved to suppress the victim impact
statement, arguing that it was “both irrelevant and unduly inflammatory,
and therefore its use in a capital case violated the Eighth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.”62 The Maryland trial court denied the motion, and
Booth received a death sentence. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed
the sentence.63 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited the consideration of
victim impact evidence by a capital sentencing jury. The Supreme Court
decided that such evidence was prohibited.64
The Court reasoned that the information in the victim impact statement
was irrelevant and created a “constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury
may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”65
One reason capital sentencing decisions based on victim impact statements
are arbitrary is that such statements can vary greatly from case to case based
on the ability of the family members to articulate their grief.66 The Court
noted that in sentencing, a capital jury must focus on the defendant as a
unique human being, but that a victim impact statement instead focuses “on
the character and reputation of the victim and the effect on [the victim’s]

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 498, 510.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499.
Id.
Id. at 500–01.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 501–02.
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 505.
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family.”67 These factors are unlikely to be related to the blameworthiness
of the defendant and could shift the “jury’s attention away from the
defendant’s background and record, and the circumstances of the crime.”68
B. SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS—THE SUPREME COURT EXTENDS
BOOTH’S HOLDING TO PROSECUTORS’ FINAL ARGUMENTS

Not long after its decision in Booth, the Supreme Court heard another
case related to victim impact evidence, South Carolina v. Gathers.69 In
Gathers, the Court considered whether a prosecutor’s closing argument,
which included extensive comments on the victim’s character, was
admissible as victim impact evidence despite the fact that the information
did not come from a family member of the victim.70 The Supreme Court of
South Carolina, in light of Booth, reversed the defendant’s death sentence in
Gathers and remanded for a new sentencing procedure.71 The United States
Supreme Court agreed, stating:
While in this case it was the prosecutor rather than the victim’s survivors who
characterized the victim’s personal qualities, the statement is indistinguishable in any
relevant respect from that in Booth. As in Booth, “[a]llowing the jury to rely on [this
information] . . . could result in imposing the death sentence because of factors about
72
which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill.”

In Gathers, Justice Scalia penned a vigorous dissent.73 He argued that
stare decisis should not prevent an overruling of Booth v. Maryland, since it
was an erroneous opinion.74 The next major Supreme Court case involving
victim impact evidence granted Justice Scalia’s wish. Just four years after
Booth v. Maryland, and two years after South Carolina v. Gathers, the
Supreme Court took the unusual step of overruling its recent precedent.75
C. PAYNE V. TENNESSEE—THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES ITSELF AND
ALLOWS VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL SENTENCING

In Payne, the defendant, Pervis Payne, was convicted on two counts of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death for both murders.76 Payne’s
girlfriend lived in an apartment across the hall from the victims, Charisse
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 504.
Id. at 505.
490 U.S. 805 (1989).
Id. at 810–11.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 811 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987)).
Id. at 823–25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
Id. at 811.
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Christopher and her two-year-old daughter, Lacie.77 Payne went into
Charisse’s apartment and made sexual advances towards her, becoming
violent when she resisted.78 A neighbor called the police after hearing what
she described as a “blood curdling scream.”79 When the police arrived, they
found Charisse and her daughter dead from numerous stabbing wounds
inflicted by a butcher knife.80 Despite severe wounds, Charisse’s threeyear-old son, Nicholas, survived.81
At the sentencing phase of trial, victim impact evidence was presented,
largely centering around the effect of the murder on Nicholas.82 Payne
received the death sentence.83 The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed
this sentence despite the defendant’s argument that the victim impact
evidence violated his Eighth Amendment rights under Booth and Gathers.84
1. Majority Decision in Payne
The Court in Payne gave a nod to the concern that victim impact
evidence would result in juries finding defendants whose victims were an
asset to the community more deserving of punishment than those whose
victims were perceived as less worthy.85 The Court, however, went on to
say that victim impact evidence was not offered for the purpose of
encouraging such comparisons, but rather to show that each victim was a
unique human being.86
The Payne majority concluded that, within constitutional limitations,
states are free to prescribe the method by which those who commit murder
should be punished.87 States remain free to develop new procedures and
methods to punish, and, according to Payne, victim impact evidence is just
another method.88 The Court concluded that the Booth decision was wrong,
and that victim impact evidence in the majority of cases serves legitimate
purposes.
[A] State may properly conclude that for a jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s
moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id. at 812.
Id.
Id. at 812–13.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 814–16.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id. at 824.
Id. at 824–25.
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phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant . . . . By turning the
victim into a “faceless stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial,” Booth deprives
the State of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury from having
before it all the information necessary to determine the proper punishment for first89
degree murder.

In an opinion that discounted the view that “death is different,”90 the
Court in Payne agreed with the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The Supreme
Court of Tennessee rejected Payne’s arguments regarding the unfairness of
victim impact evidence at his trial. They reasoned that it is an affront to
civilized humans to allow unlimited witnesses to present mitigating
evidence for the defendant, but not to allow evidence on the character of or
harm inflicted on the victim.91 The Court rejected the view that the
defendant should get the broadest latitude under the Eighth Amendment
while not permitting the state to argue to the jury the human cost of the
crime the defendant committed.92
2. Dissenting Opinions in Payne
Two dissents were written in Payne. Justice Marshall’s dissent argued
that even if the defendant were in a position to foresee the likely impact of
his crime, victim impact evidence still creates an unacceptable risk of
arbitrariness in sentencing.93 Justice Marshall reiterated the Booth view that
victim impact evidence has an inherent capacity to draw the jury’s attention
away from the defendant’s character and the circumstances of the crime to
things that should not bear on a sentencing decision, such as the eloquence
of family members in expressing their grief or the status of the victim in the
community.94 Justice Marshall reminded the Court that death is different
from other punishments, and chastised the majority for using noncapital
sentencing procedures to infer proper treatment of sentencing issues in
capital cases.95
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that, up until the majority’s
decision in Payne, a decision to impose the death penalty had to be based
solely on evidence informing the jury about the character of the offense and
the defendant.96 He wrote, “evidence that serves no purpose other than to
appeal to the sympathies of the jurors has never been considered
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. (citations omitted).
See supra Part II.B.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 826.
Id. at 826–27.
Id. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 846 n.1.
Id. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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admissible.”97 Justice Stevens argued that since the victim’s character was
not on trial, it should not be used as either an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance.98 His arguments also supported the idea that death is
different.99 His dissent pointed out that the Constitution grants certain
rights to the criminal defendant and imposes special limitations on the state
to protect the defendant from its disproportionate power.100 Criminal
prosecution therefore does not require an even balance between the
defendant and the state.101 Perhaps most relevant to the idea that jurors too
easily identify with victim impact statements was Justice Stevens’s
response to the majority’s assertion that victim impact evidence shows that
each victim is unique. Justice Stevens stated that “[t]he fact that each one
of us is unique is a proposition so obvious that it surely requires no
evidentiary support.”102
Despite the arguments of the Payne dissenters, Payne v. Tennessee has
not been overruled and stands as the current law on victim impact evidence
in capital cases.103
D. KELLY V. CALIFORNIA—THE COURT DENIES CERTIORARI ON A
RECENT VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE CASE

The most recent Supreme Court consideration of victim impact
evidence resulted in denial of certiorari in the case of Kelly v. California.104
Kelly v. California involved two cases where victim impact evidence was
presented in video format.105
Kelly involved the murder of nineteen-year-old Sara Weir, whose body
was found several days after she had been stabbed to death with a pair of
scissors.106 The body was nude and wrapped in a blanket, and a plastic bag
was taped over the head with a helmet over the bag.107 Kelly’s fingerprints
were found on the tape and helmet.108 Kelly, who did not present any
evidence at either the guilt or the sentencing phase, was sentenced to
97

Id. at 856–57.
Id. at 859.
99
Id. at 860.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 866.
103
Id. at 830 (majority opinion).
104
129 S. Ct. 564, 564 (2008) (denying certiorari).
105
The video used as a victim impact
http://www.supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx.
106
People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 555 (Cal. 2007).
107
Id.
108
Id.
98

statement

is

available

at
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death.109
At sentencing, the victim’s mother presented a videotape of Sara’s life
set to music that was played to the jury.110 Kelly appealed his death
sentence, arguing that the videotape should not have been admitted.111
However, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the probative
value of the tape exceeded any prejudicial value, and affirmed the
sentence.112
Justice Stevens disagreed with the decision to deny certiorari for Kelly
v. California.113 Even if the Court did not want to proscribe victim impact
evidence completely, Justice Stevens noted that the Payne decision’s lack
of guidance on what was permissible as victim impact evidence has resulted
in a lack of clear limits on the scope, quantity, or type of victim impact
evidence capital juries are permitted to consider.114 The only guidance that
Payne provided was that victim impact evidence relating to the victim’s
personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the
victim’s family was permissible.115
States have admitted a wide variety of victim impact evidence, such as
evidence regarding the victim’s good character, talents, intelligence,
spirituality, work ethic, education, and standing in the community, to name
just a few.116 Most states do not limit the number of witnesses who can
give victim impact evidence, and have allowed a wide range of evidence to
be presented concerning the murder’s effects on the victim’s family. 117 Not
only has the verbal testimony allowed been broad, but courts have allowed
victim impact testimony in several other media as well.118 These media
have included “poems, videotapes, pre-death photographs, and handcrafted
items made by the victim.”119
More guidance on victim impact evidence and more limits on the types
of victim impact evidence that are admissible would lower the risk that the
jury will decide a capital defendant’s sentence in an arbitrary and capricious

109

Id. at 556–57.
Id. at 557.
111
Id. at 567–68.
112
Id.
113
129 S. Ct. 564, 566 (2008) (statement by Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
114
Id.
115
John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 257, 269 (2003).
116
Id. at 269–70.
117
Id. at 270.
118
Id. at 271.
119
Id. at 271–72.
110
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manner. The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in the case of
Kelly v. California to revisit the issue of victim impact evidence. Even if
the Court chose not to proscribe victim impact evidence entirely, it could
have offered some much-needed guidance to the lower courts on the types
of victim impact evidence that may be used in capital sentencing.
IV. EXPLANATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHEMAS
The information presented in victim impact statements has the
potential to overpower the constitutionally required mitigating information
presented on behalf of the capital defendant. This is in part because the
victim’s story is generally more recognizable and relatable to the juror’s
own experiences than is the story of the defendant. Cognitive psychology
recognizes that people filter information in a way that focuses on what is
familiar through the use of schemas.
A brief overview of some of the cognitive structures that are involved
in decisionmaking is helpful in understanding this concept of filtering
information. A schema is a cognitive structure that categorizes information
in the mind about certain subjects.120 This includes both general knowledge
of the subject, as well as specific instances.121 For example, a supermarket
schema might contain the general information that supermarkets are often
part of a shopping center. A supermarket schema may also contain the
specific example of the supermarket where a particular individual usually
shops.122
Schemas are used to assign meaning to information we receive. 123
Schemas give us a frame of reference that we can use to interpret incoming
information by matching it with preexisting schemas.124 For example, if we
receive information about a store located in a shopping center that sells food
items, we may filter it through our supermarket schema and realize that the
store is a supermarket. Schemas also help us filter out irrelevant stimuli
and focus on information that seems important.125
There are three main types of social schemas: person, role, and
event.126 Person schemas contain information about specific personality
types (for example, what an introvert is).127 Role schemas contain
120
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information about different occupations or social roles, as well as social
groups (for example, parents, blacks, or women).128 Event schemas contain
information about a variety of social events (for example, football games,
faculty meetings, or robberies).129
Schemas also contain what are known as prototypes.130 A prototype is
not a specific instance, but rather can be defined as the best or most
representative example of a schema.131 For example, an individual’s
prototypical football player, or her best example of a football player, may
be someone who is heavyset and muscular (but not an actual football player
with whom the individual is acquainted).132 A prototype of an event
schema can be referred to as a “script.”133
V. HOW JURIES USE SCHEMAS TO PROCESS INFORMATION
Jurors often make decisions based on likelihoods rather than on
absolute certainties.134 When placed in such situations, people often use
simplifying strategies known as heuristics to make decisions, rather than
using mathematical or statistical methods.135 Jurors use a common
heuristic, the representative heuristic, in conjunction with schematic
information processing to make decisions.136 This is because jurors
categorize statements and stories they hear through representative
heuristics, “which hold[] that the likelihood that event A belongs to class X
is equal to the degree to which A resembles or is similar to X.”137 When a
juror is given information about a person, the juror uses that information to
determine the likelihood that the person fits within a particular social
schema.138
Juries use schema and scripts to decide which stories are believable or
true. They assess the quality of a party’s story against their own
schemas.139 Professor Moore explains:
At trial, jurors are typically presented with concrete stories about human intentions
and the nature of human affairs. Whether the representativeness heuristic reflects a
128
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particular mode of thought used to interpret these stories or a shorthand strategy for
dealing with concrete problems, it seems that the jury’s determination of “what really
happened” will often be strongly influenced by the degree to which the concrete
detailed stories told by the parties at trial match the instances or prototypes in the
140
jurors’ relevant schemas.

Additionally, “concrete, emotionally interesting information has greater
power [than abstract information has] to capture a juror’s attention.”141
This is because concrete, emotional information is more likely to call up
schemas or scripts that are well-worn into the juror’s mind.142 These
previously existing scripts will be familiar and easier for the juror to
grasp.143
Research shows that individuals do not call up all available schemas
when assessing information.144 Jurors filter out some potential schematic
matches and use a limited number of schemas when assessing information
at trial.145 Jurors’ use of schemas at trial poses a potential problem with the
jurors’ ability to hear and weigh all the evidence. This problem is referred
to as belief perseverance.146
Belief perseverance essentially keeps a juror from changing his or her
mind regarding an initial assessment of an uncertain event.147 When
presented with information, individuals often use scripts and schema to fill
in the background information to explain why something happened the way
it did, or why something is the way it is.148 Once a juror has constructed an
explanatory theory in this way, it becomes difficult for him or her to call the
theory into question or pay attention to other potential feature matches.149
Moore explains that “[p]eople generally try to minimize cognitive
dissonance, that is, inconsistencies between their actions and their attitudes
and beliefs . . . . [T]hey will explain away seemingly aberrant results in a
way that does not call into question the validity of their initial judgment.”150
Belief perseverance makes it difficult for jurors to change the initial
impressions they form of a case. A juror’s assessment of information
through schemas of what is familiar to him or her may prevent
140

Id. at 292.
Id. at 290.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 71–72 (2004).
145
Moore, supra note 3, at 293.
146
Id. at 300.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 302.
141

2012]

SILENCED STORIES

243

consideration of other countervailing information. A juror will look for and
remember information that supports his or her initial impression.151
In other words, much potentially useful information at trial is filtered
out and attention is instead focused on information that fits stored schemas
or scripts.152 Cognitive filters prevent jurors from considering all relevant
evidence at trial. Instead, they consider the evidence that is most familiar to
them and best fits their schemas and scripts.153 People distort things in the
direction of the familiar, and use scripts as templates to do so.154 People
follow the path of least dissonance, and jurors are no different. As
discussed earlier, the beliefs they form will persist and make it difficult for
them to see evidence contradicting those beliefs.155
Schemas undermine the fairness of sentencing hearings that allow
victim impact evidence. Deeply ingrained cultural and social storylines
often subconsciously influence our sense of how truth and justice should
operate in the world.156 We see and judge through filters that affect how we
hear another’s story, translate it into something consistent with our own
experiences, and omit or distort information to “tell a smoother tale—a tale
whose prototype waits in the mind to be triggered.”157 This can have
significant effect on how a juror interprets information at trial.
Cognitive psychology scientifically shows that individuals best
understand information that matches their own experiences.158 Because of
this, bridging disparate types of experiences often requires emphasizing
what perspectives are shared in common and downplaying perspectives that
are not shared.159 It is not hard to see how victim impact statements
essentially do the opposite of this. They emphasize a story that is generally
easy to understand: the pain that a murder victim’s family feels. It is not
hard for most people to imagine on some level the emotional pain and
horror of losing a loved one so tragically. However, the defendant’s story is
less likely to fit into a juror’s scripts, and is downplayed as a result. How
many jurors realistically understand the mitigating factors that have driven
a capital defendant to commit a brutal murder? Professor Bandes notes that
151
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“[w]ho we are determines what we notice, what seems important, how we
react to it, what connections we draw, and what meaning we attach to
things . . . . [T]he stories we hear . . . are shaped by who we are.”160 To
rephrase this in light of schema theory, the stories we notice and how we
react to them are shaped by the experiences we have had in life and the
schemas that have resulted from those experiences.
Often, the dominant narrative drowns out the alternative story.161 In
order for the alternative story (for our purposes, the defendant’s story of
what factors in his life led him to kill) to be heard, the dominant narrative
(the victim’s story) cannot be told.162 Victim impact statements are stories
that should not be told because they block the jury’s ability to hear the
defendant’s story.163 If the defendant’s story is not heard, the jury has not
truly considered the mitigating factors. A person’s ability to empathize
with those from different ethnic, racial, religious, or economic backgrounds
is often hindered by ingrained, preconscious assumptions about them. 164
Narrow perspectives make relating to different life experiences and values a
difficult task.165
Aristotle recognized that to accurately judge a wrongdoer, you must be
able to put yourself in his shoes to truly comprehend the obstacles he
faces.166 The jury must attempt to put itself in the shoes of the capital
defendant in order to accurately judge whether the defendant is deserving of
the death penalty. The schemas that the emotions behind a victim impact
statement trigger deflect the jury from considering the moral culpability of
the defendant.
How does this happen? How do schemas and victim impact evidence
tie in with the decisions that a jury makes? As noted earlier, schemas give
us a frame of reference whereby we interpret incoming information.167 The
socially instilled storylines that we carry in our heads affect our sense of
truth and justice.168
Mark Turner said: “Story is a basic principle of mind. Most of our
experience, our knowledge, and our thinking are organized as stories.” 169
160
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Law deals with stories, and stories are never more important in law than
when they are presented at a capital defendant’s sentencing hearing. How
well the stories are told and received in this situation can literally make the
difference between life and death for the capital defendant. To be
successful at trial, lawyers must tell stories that will influence jurors to call
up the schemas that will be beneficial to their clients.
The stories presented as victim impact evidence are frequently
emotional, capturing the jury’s attention more easily than the often
unfamiliar information contained in the defendant’s story.170 Once the
juror’s attention is captured and he or she is listening, a victim impact
evidence story is usually easier for a juror to match to a preexisting schema.
The persuasive value of a victim impact statement comes from its ability to
evoke shared images—images such as goodness, Christian piety, the little
guy, and American patriotism.171
The prosecution in a capital trial attempts to vividly portray the lawless
violence of the defendant, while “muting racial injustice, poverty and abuse
that often shape the life of killers.”172 Remember, people are prone to use
schemas to fill in background information about why something happened
the way it did. It stands to reason, then, that jurors who have trouble
finding a schema that matches the defendant’s story may view that story as
implausible, and fill in the background with their own schemas. For
example, a juror may reject a defendant’s rough background as a valid
explanation of why the defendant committed an atrocious crime, because
there is no matching schema and the explanation is therefore implausible.173
As evidenced by a severe jury verdict in a case where the jury did not
believe the defendant’s story, juries evaluate the stories they hear and have
strong negative reactions to stories they deem implausible.174 Additionally,
gut reactions to implausible stories can include reactions of moral
outrage.175 In the absence of an explanation, the juror may fall back on a
schema already present in his or her mind, such as, ‘there are no
explanations for such actions,’ making someone who commits such a
heinous crime deserving of death.
Capital trials effectively hide and make invisible some kinds of
violence.176 A binary opposition between the angelic character of the
murder victim who did not deserve to die and the evil character of the
170
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perpetrator who does not deserve to live is the dominant cultural motif for
representing violence and victimization. Instead of confronting complex
social problems, we are invited to see them in stark and simple terms.177
Lawyers for capital defendants attempt to make the jury hear a story
that goes “beyond evil deeds to the desperate lives that produce those
deeds.”178 This is a difficult task, however, because schemas developed by
jurors influence how they react to stories they hear, so the narratives told for
a capital defendant must connect to commonplace, culturally recognizable
themes.179 The power of a victim impact statement’s more recognizable
story may easily drown out the defendant’s story, blocking any chance the
defendant has of actually receiving meaningful consideration of the
mitigating circumstances in his case.180
VI. ANALYSIS OF A VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE STORY
To understand the imbalance between the story told in the victim
impact evidence and the story told in the defendant’s mitigating factors, an
analysis of those factors in a particular case is helpful. As mentioned
earlier, this Comment will conduct an analysis of both the victim impact
evidence and the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing hearing in
United States v. Sampson.181
A. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES V. SAMPSON

In United States v. Sampson, Gary Sampson was convicted on two
counts of carjacking resulting in death, and was sentenced to death for these
convictions.182
Sampson committed several brutal murders. Sampson first killed
Phillip McCloskey on July 24, 2001.183 Sampson was hitchhiking and
McCloskey picked him up. Sampson killed McCloskey by stabbing him
with a knife and attempted to steal his automobile.184 A few days later, on
July 27, Sampson was again hitchhiking and was picked up by a college
student, Jonathan Rizzo.185 Sampson tied Rizzo to a tree, then stabbed him
to death and stole his automobile.186 On July 30, Sampson committed
177
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180
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another murder by tying Robert Whitney to a chair and strangling him to
death.187 Sampson then stole Whitney’s automobile.188 Finally, on July 31,
Sampson was again hitchhiking and was picked up by William Gregory, on
whom he pulled a knife.189 Gregory, however, escaped and called the
police to report his car stolen.190 Not long afterwards, Sampson called the
police and surrendered.191
Sampson offered to plead guilty and accept a federal sentence of life in
prison without parole.192 However, his plea was rejected by the Department
of Justice, and, on November 19, 2002, the Attorney General filed a notice
to seek the death penalty against Sampson.193 Sampson pled guilty on both
counts, and a jury was impaneled to determine the penalty, which it decided
should be death.194
B. THE VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN SAMPSON

In Sampson, the prosecution had six witnesses testify as victim impact
witnesses: three of McCloskey’s adult children, Rizzo’s parents, and one of
Rizzo’s younger brothers.195 The witnesses’ testimony was given in a
question-and-answer format and comprised about two hours of prosecution
evidence.196 The judge gave the jury a lengthy explanation of the reasons
for which the jury could permissibly consider the victim impact evidence.197
Even though he noted that the jury was not permitted to allow the “victim’s
families’ testimony to overwhelm [its] ability to follow the law,”198 the
judge also told the jury that “I expect that the testimony that you’re going to
start hearing soon will be emotional. In fact, [the Deputy Clerk] has some
[Kleenex] and if we discern that anybody wants or needs it, he’ll give it to
you.”199 Despite the acknowledgement that the testimony was likely to be
emotional, the judge finished his instructions with the severe warning that
“You may not base the decision on undue sympathy, passion, or
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prejudice.”200
C. THE DEFENDANT’S MITIGATING EVIDENCE IN SAMPSON

In Sampson, the defense introduced mitigating evidence showing that
Sampson was mentally ill and had been abused as a child.201 Sampson
argued that his capacity to conform his conduct to the law was significantly
impaired.202 The federal death penalty statute provides that if a person’s
ability to conform his conduct to the law is significantly impaired, even
though not impaired enough to consider him not guilty, this can still be a
mitigating factor making him less blameworthy than someone without
comparable impairment.203
The defense in Sampson tried to prove mental illness and brain
dysfunction.204 Brain dysfunction occurs when a person’s brain has
difficulty performing certain functions such as controlling impulses.205
Such impairment can be caused by things such as mental illness, alcohol
abuse, or withdrawal from use of drugs.206
Testimony for the defense at Sampson’s trial painted a picture of
Sampson’s troubled life. A social worker at Sampson’s trial testified that
Sampson’s life began unraveling at age twelve with the use of drugs and
alcohol.207 Sampson claimed that his father beat him and verbally abused
him.208 A prison counselor testified that, while Sampson was serving time
for theft and burglary, he frequently sought help for mental health and
substance abuse issues.209 A forensic neuropsychiatrist testified that
Sampson knew that what he was doing when he murdered was wrong, but
that he lacked the capacity to stop himself.210 Despite the fact that the
defense raised seventeen mitigating factors, the jury did not feel that the
mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors, and they sentenced
200
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Sampson to death.211
D. ANALYSIS OF AGGRAVATING VS. MITIGATING EVIDENCE IN
SAMPSON

The two competing narratives in United States v. Sampson gave jurors
a tough decision to make. Should they listen more closely to the story the
victims told of the incredible loss suffered in the aftermath of a horrible
murder, or should they listen to the story the defendant told of being driven
to commit horrendous crimes in the aftermath of a tough life? This is a
common choice juries must make in a capital sentencing trial.
The jurors in the Sampson case had to decide if the defendant’s
purported mental illness was real and was substantial enough to make him
undeserving of the death penalty. In the end, the jury rejected Sampson’s
story of mental illness.212 Interestingly, the judge in this case disagreed
with the jury’s finding that Sampson was not mentally ill.213 The jury said
that the proof of mental illness was lacking, but Judge Mark Wolf openly
disagreed with the jury and stated that he believed Sampson was indeed
mentally ill.214
What caused the jury to reject Sampson’s story? Look at the
competing storylines and consider the schemas they were likely to evoke.
The storyline of the victims is one of good citizens caught in the wrong
place at the wrong time. McCloskey and Rizzo were kind, generous souls,
to a fault. They gave a ride to a fellow citizen, who appeared to need
assistance. Yet this kindness resulted in horrific murders, which left behind
families devastated by the loss of a member of their close-knit clan.215 A
jury, hearing this information, could recognize this storyline and accept it as
plausible. A good citizen who is part of a close family matches a wellrecognized, socially acceptable schema.
The storyline of the defendant, on the other hand, is a story of a wild,
cold-hearted individual with no self-control. The defense tried to convince
the jury that Sampson lacked the ability to stop himself from acting the way
he did,216 but the jurors could not accept this. One juror noted that she
rejected the mental illness claim because there was testimony in the case
211
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that Sampson could tell right from wrong.217 The jury had trouble trying to
find a schema matching the information that the defense presented about
how Sampson’s mental disturbances drove him to commit a series of brutal
murders. Mark Rizzo, father of murder victim Jonathan Rizzo, expressed
his (understandable) frustration at the defense’s attempt to mitigate
Sampson’s actions.218 Rizzo said, “I think this is going to make us more
frustrated and angry, to have to listen to people depict him as a good guy
who had things go wrong in his life.”219 Although the father of a murder
victim certainly cannot be faulted for his emotions at a sentencing trial, the
jury is not supposed to let sentiments like this sway their reasoned
decisions. However, Mark Rizzo’s feelings seem to have resonated with
the jurors as well. The jurors in Sampson’s case could not accept the
mitigating evidence that someone could have had so many severe issues and
problems in his life that the death penalty was too cruel a punishment.
Instead, they accepted the story that what Sampson had done was so
depraved, and so unforgiveable and unexplainable, that he deserved to be
excluded permanently from the human community.220
Sampson appealed his sentence and moved for a new trial, arguing that
his lawyers at his initial sentencing trial did not give the jurors a full picture
of his troubled life.221 Sampson argued that, if the jury had received more
information about his mental illness and childhood trauma, he would not
have been given a unanimous death sentence.222 On October 20, 2011, a
federal judge threw out the death sentence against Sampson and ordered a
new trial.223 The judge said that Sampson is “entitled to a new trial to
determine whether the death penalty is justified in his case.”224
VII. CONCLUSION
Although victim impact evidence may be acceptable in certain types of
sentencing, capital punishment is a special situation. Because “death is
different,” there must be strict controls on what information is presented to
a jury when a defendant’s life hangs in the balance. The decision to execute
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a defendant is absolutely irreversible and should not be taken lightly. The
Supreme Court has recognized that a sentence of capital punishment must
not be decided upon arbitrarily and that meaningful consideration must be
given to all mitigating factors. Yet, the Supreme Court, despite allowing
victim impact evidence, nevertheless has recognized that there is a risk of
passion overwhelming reason in sentencing.225
Where should the line be drawn on what victim impact evidence is
admissible in capital sentencing? Victim impact statements tell stories that
are so easily identifiable to jurors that they cause jurors to easily match
them with preexisting schemas and ignore the information presented as the
defendant’s story.226 This means that jurors do not give meaningful
consideration to the defendant’s mitigating evidence, an outcome that is
constitutionally unacceptable.
Because of the danger that the story told in the victim impact evidence
will silence the story of the defendant told by the mitigating evidence, the
best outcome would be for the Supreme Court to return to its original ruling
in Booth v. Maryland and prohibit victim impact evidence statements in
capital trials altogether. It may, however, be unrealistic to expect the Court
to overturn Payne, which is now a nearly twenty-year-old precedent. Short
of overturning Payne altogether, the Court should at the very least grant
certiorari on the next capital sentencing victim impact evidence case that it
has the opportunity to hear. Had the Court reviewed People v. Kelly, it
could have set limits on how much and what types of victim impact
evidence were permissible. This would have at least minimized the passion
and arbitrariness that such evidence injects into the required fair reasoning
process of a capital sentencing verdict.
“Death is different,” and the Constitution of the United States requires
that no individual be deprived of his freedom, or life, without due process
of law.227 Although the actions of capital defendants are morally
reprehensible, our Constitution requires that their stories should be heard.
The silencing of these stories through victim impact evidence must be
ended.
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